CTM360 Hardening Guidelines
What’s on this page
Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) allows unauthenticated remote code execution and is triggered when a specially crafted string provided by the attacker through a variety of different input vectors, is parsed and processed by the Log4j vulnerable component. Microsoft stated that a vast majority of post-exploitation activities had been observed and based on the nature of the vulnerability, once an attacker has full access and control of an application, they can perform a myriad of objectives including installing coin miners, Cobalt Strike to enable credential theft and lateral movement as well as exfiltrating data from compromised systems. Relevant to Log4j vulnerability below are the most common MITRE ATT@CK Techniques that an attacker may leverage to compromise systems.
TECHNIQUE#1 - Exploitation for Client Execution
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to insecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution.
CTM360: Mitigation Guidelines:
Note: Before disabling a service/configuration, please check if any endpoint requires it for a specific use case and only allow it where necessary.
Option 1:
Enable ASR (Attack Surface Reduction) from Group Policy: By leveraging MS ASR rules and relevant IDs to block specific actions from executing on Desktop or Server
Open Group Policy Editor [Local/Domain] click Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative templates > Windows components > Microsoft Defender Antivirus > Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard > Attack surface reduction.
On Right Side double click on “Configure Attack surface reduction rules” and select Enabled.
Now under options: click on the Show… button and the Show Contents windows will Open.
In Value Name type the below IDs and set the Value to 1 for each rule and click OK to save settings.
Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts
ID = 5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC Value = 1Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content
ID = D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D Value = 1Block Office application from creating child processes
ID = d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a Value = 1Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes
ID = 75668c1f-73b5-4cf0-bb93-3ecf5cb7cc84 Value = 1Block Win32 API calls from Office macros
ID = 92e97fa1-2edf-4476-bdd6-9dd0b4dddc7b Value = 1
Option 2:
Block Office Macros From Group Policy
(Below steps for Microsoft office 2016/2019) Install the Office 2016 Administrative Template files (ADMX/ADML) and Office Customization Tool on the Active Directory Domain Controller Upon completing the installation, follow the steps below: (For office2016, download the templates from Microsoft. Download link)
Open Group Policy Editor[Local/Domain] > User Configuration > Policies > Administrative templates > Microsoft Word 2016 > Word options > Security > Trust Center
On the right side double click on “Block macros from running in Office files from the Internet” and select Enabled > Click OK to save settings. Double click on “VBA Macro Notification Settings” and select Enabled
Under options select "Disable all without notification" from the drop-down list. Note: Follow the above steps to disable Macros for other Microsoft Office Applications like Excel, PowerPoint etc.)
Option 3:
Enable Controlled Folder Access Controlled folder access helps protect your valuable data from malicious apps and threats, such as ransomware. Open Group Policy Editor[Local/Domain] > Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > Windows components > Microsoft Defender Antivirus > Microsoft Defender Exploit Guard > Controlled folder access
On the right side window double click on “Configure Controlled folder access” and select Enabled
Under options > Configure the guard my folders feature Select Block from the drop-down list and Click OK to Save Settings. This is a strict mode where untrusted apps cannot make any changes to files inside protected folders.
Note: Enable this with caution as it may affect the organization’s productivity
- TECHNIQUE#2 - Ingress Tool Transfer
- TECHNIQUE#3 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- TECHNIQUE#4 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- TECHNIQUE#5 - OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
- TECHNIQUE#6 - Windows Management Instrumentation
- TECHNIQUE#7 - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- TECHNIQUE#8 - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
Recommendations
This hardening guide is part of CTM360’s ongoing strategy to provide actionable insights and tangible recommendations for major ransomware families. Our research team will be sharing such advisories frequently to ensure organizations globally become a harder target and can prevent the impact of ransomware proactively. We invite your feedback and welcome your input for future editions of our security hardening series. Kindly reach out to monitor@ctm360.com for any communication.
Recent Blogs
TRAP10 Mini App Scam
Overview:
CTM360 has discovered a new variation of scam tactics using Telegram Mini Apps and social media ads in a Ponzi-style scheme. Scammers impersonate financial institutions, leveraging Meta Ads, Telegram Ads, and fake social media accounts to lure victims into fraudulent investment platforms.
These platforms, embedded within Telegram, present a polished interface that mimics legitimate trading sites. Victims are enticed with promises of high returns, referral bonuses, and exclusive investment opportunities. Once inside, they are encouraged to deposit cryptocurrency, believing they are engaging in real trading. However, withdrawals are consistently blocked when users attempt to cash out.
CTM360 Observations
Resource Development
Telegram Mini App
- A Mini App in Telegram is a lightweight web application that runs within the Telegram interface, allowing users to interact with services like payments, games, or trading platforms without leaving the app.
- Scammers embed these fake websites inside Telegram Mini Apps, making them accessible within Telegram itself.
- Users interact with the fake platform through Telegram bots keeping them within the scam ecosystem.
Scammers also create fake websites with dedicated domains that mimic real platforms, solely for fraudulent trading, deposits, and referral scams.
Trigger
Scammers lure victims with false promises of high, risk-free returns, financial incentives like bonuses and referral rewards, and fake branding to appear credible. They create urgency with limited-time offers and countdowns to pressure quick investments.
Distribution
Scammers spread the fraud across multiple platforms:
- Meta & Telegram Ads – Paid ads and channels drive users to fake trading platforms.
- Telegram Bots & Channels – Used to lure victims into scam sites and mini-apps.
- Social Media & Messaging Apps – Victims unknowingly spread the scam by inviting friends for bonuses.
By using ads, fake profiles, and victim referrals, scammers rapidly expand their reach.
Target Interaction
Impersonated and Bogus Profiles
- Fake social media accounts are created to promote, manage and provide fake customer service to the victims
- We have also noticed scammers impersonating financial institutions, investment platforms and other industry organizations on Telegram to lure victims.
Impersonated or Bogus Websites embedded within Telegram Mini App
- The scam operates within a Telegram Mini App, where victims are redirected to the fake investment website.
- The Mini App will retrieve victim’s Telegram details and allow them quick access on these fake websites without sign-up.
- Upon sign-up, victims are requested to deposit funds and trade but withdrawals are blocked.
Motive
- PII Harvesting – Scammers collects your email address, phone number, Telegram IDs during the sign up process.
Monetization
- Payments to Cryptocurrency Wallets – Victims are tricked into transferring funds via cryptocurrency (e.g., USDT, BNB, TRX) to scam-controlled wallets.
- Selling Data on the Dark Web – The stolen credentials, Telegram IDs, emails, and phone numbers can likely be sold on underground forums or leveraged for future cyber criminal activities
Recommendations
For Individuals:
- Avoid Telegram Mini Apps for Trading – Scammers use them to bypass security measures.
- Verify Websites & Domains – Always check official sources before engaging in financial transactions.
- Use 2FA on All Accounts – Protect Telegram and crypto wallets from unauthorized access.
- Never transfer funds to an account without verifying the purpose and recipient independently.
For Businesses:
- Scan social media, Telegram, and ad networks for scams related to your brand and report them accordingly.
- Work with platforms to remove and takedown fraudulent sites.
- Educate and warn users on common fraud schemes.
Disclaimer
The information contained in this document is meant to provide general guidance and brief information to the intended recipient pertaining to the incident and recommended action. Therefore, this information is provided "as is" without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, timeliness, and completeness. Consequently, under NO condition shall CTM360®, its related partners, directors, principals, agents, or employees be liable for any direct, indirect, accidental, special, exemplary, punitive, consequential, or other damages or claims whatsoever including, but not limited to: loss of data, loss in profits/business, network disruption…etc., arising out of or in connection with this advisory.
For more information:
Email: monitor@ctm360.com Tel: (+973) 77 360 360
Securing Browsing Extensions
Summary:
In December 2024, hackers compromised at least 35 Google Chrome extensions, affecting approximately 2.6 million users. The attack exploited phishing emails sent to developers, masquerading as Google policy violation notices. These emails tricked developers into granting permissions to a malicious OAuth application named
“Privacy Policy Extension.
” Once authorized, the attackers gained control over the extensions, injecting malicious code to steal user data, particularly targeting Facebook credentials and business accounts. Browser extensions can significantly enhance productivity by adding new features to web browsers like Microsoft Edge and Google Chrome. However, they also pose significant security risks, as malicious or compromised extensions can lead to data breaches, malware infections, and unauthorized access to corporate networks. It is crucial for organizations to control, block, or manage browser extensions to minimize security risks, particularly in an enterprise environment. This advisory outlines the steps to block and protect browser extensions for Microsoft Edge and Google Chrome, and it also includes specific guidance on managing extensions using Microsoft Intune.
Risks Associated With Browser Extensions
● Data Exposure: Some extensions can access sensitive data (e.g., browsing history, credentials, and files), potentially exposing confidential information.
● Malicious Extensions: Cybercriminals can create or compromise extensions, making them a vector for malware distribution or data exfiltration.
● Phishing Risks: Extensions may manipulate web content, tricking users into providing sensitive information.
● Performance Degradation: Some poorly coded extensions can slow down browsers or degrade system performance.
Managing Browser Extensions Using Group Policy
A. Microsoft Edge
Using Group Policy (Windows)
1. Open the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC).
2. Navigate to: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Microsoft Edge > Extensions
3. Set the following policies:
a. Control which extensions are installed silently: Specify allowed extensions by adding their extension IDs.
b. Configure extension management settings: T o block all extensions, set this policy to "*" (deny all).
c. Configure the list of force-installed extensions: If any extension is necessary for business, add the corresponding extension ID here.
B. Google Chrome
Using Group Policy (Windows)
1. Open the Group Policy Editor.
2. Navigate to: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Google > Google Chrome > Extensions
3. Set the following policies:
a. Block external extensions: Set the policy to block all extensions unless specifically allowed by adding the extension IDs.
b. Configure extension install allow list: If certain extensions are necessary, add their extension IDs here.
c. Configure extension install blocklist: Add a wildcard"*" to block all extensions.
Managing Browser Extensions Using Microsoft Intune
Organizations using Microsoft Intune for endpoint management can apply policies to control browser extension installations across all managed devices. This approach is particularly useful for managing large numbers of endpoints efficiently.
Blocking Extensions in Microsoft Edge Using Intune
1. Sign in to Microsoft Endpoint Manager Admin Center.
2. Navigate to: Devices > Configuration profiles > Create profile
3. Choose:
a. Platform: Windows 10 and later.
b. Profile type: Settings catalog.
4. In the Configuration settings, search for Extensions under Microsoft Edge:
a. Allow specific extensions to be installed (User): Specify allowed extension IDs
b. Control which extensions cannot be installed (User): Add a wildcard"*" to block all extensions.
5. Assign this profile to your target groups (specific users or devices).
Blocking Extensions in Google Chrome Using Intune
1. Sign in to Microsoft Endpoint Manager Admin Center.
2. Navigate to: Devices > Configuration profiles > Create profile
3. Choose:
a. Platform: Windows 10 and later.
b. Profile type: Settings catalog.
4. In the Configuration settings, search for Extensions under Google Chrome\Extensions:
a. Configure extension installation allow list (User): Specify allowed extension IDs
b. Configure extension installation blocklist: Add a wildcard"*" to block all extensions.
5. Assign this profile to your target groups (specific users or devices).
Note: These steps are mentioned for user-based controls. Similar configuration steps can be applied for device-based controls.
Best Practices for Managing Browser Extensions
● Audit Extensions Regularly: Regularly audit the extensions installed on users’ browsers to detect unauthorized or risky extensions.
● User Training: Educate users about the risks associated with browser extensions and how to identify malicious ones.
● Implement a Zero-Trust Model: Always assume that extensions can potentially be compromised. Apply the principle of least privilege when granting extension permissions.
● Use Security Solutions: Consider deploying security solutions that can monitor and block malicious browser activities, including suspicious extension behavior.
Conclusion
Controlling browser extensions in Microsoft Edge and Google Chrome is a critical aspect of securing enterprise endpoints. By implementing the steps outlined above, organizations can significantly reduce the risks associated with browser extensions. Whether you manage your endpoints using Group Policy or Microsoft Intune, these controls can help protect your network from potential extension-related threats. By following this advisory, organizations can take proactive steps to mitigate browser extension risks, enhancing their overall cybersecurity posture.
Reference:
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-details-reveal-how-hackers-hijacked-35-google-chrome-extensions/
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/manage-profiles-approve-sys-extensions-intune
https://gbhackers.com/malicious-editthiscookie-extension/#google_vignette
Disclaimer
The information contained in this document is meant to provide general guidance and brief information to the intended recipient pertaining to the incident and recommended action. Therefore, this information is provided "as is" without warranties of any kind, express or implied, including accuracy, timeliness, and completeness. Consequently, under NO condition shall CTM360®, its related partners, directors, principals, agents, or employees be liable for any direct, indirect, accidental, special, exemplary, punitive, consequential, or other damages or claims whatsoever including, but not limited to: loss of data, loss in profits/business, network disruption…etc., arising out of or in connection with this advisory.
For more information:
Email: monitor@ctm360.com Tel: (+973) 77 360 360
Solar Wind Attack Update
SolarWinds - an American software vendor for managing networks and infrastructure has been breached. Orion, a network monitoring product was modified by a state-sponsored threat actor via embedding backdoor code into a legitimate SolarWinds library. This allowed remote access into the victim’s environment and a foothold in their networks; this enabled attacker to obtain privileged credentials.
The SolarWinds Orion products are designed to monitor the networks of systems and report on any security issues. Due to this, there are no comparable limiting boundaries on the scope or potential security impact; this has been made clear by the gradual revelation of more and more high-value targets. Even more worrisome is the fact that the attackers apparently made use of their initial access to targeted organizations, such as FireEye and Microsoft, to compromise tools and code that would then enable them to target other victims. After Microsoft discovered that they were breached via the SolarWinds compromise, they further discovered that their own products were then used “to further the attacks on others.”
The attack was initially disclosed by the cybersecurity firm, FireEye, as early as December 8th but published publicly on 13th. It was revealed that the attack on SolarWinds was conducted by an unknown APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) group. They were able to steal Red Team assessment tools, similarly, used by FireEye to probe its customers’ security. FireEye has made its countermeasures freely available on GitHub.
According to Microsoft, hackers acquired superuser access to SAML token-signing certificates. This SAML certificate was then used to forge new tokens to allow hackers to obtain trusted and highly privileged access to networks.
While analyzing further on this attack, it was discovered that there was another backdoor likely from a second threat actor. This malware was dubbed as SUPERNOVA. This was a web shell planted in the code of the Orion network and applications monitoring platform and enabled attackers to run arbitrary code on machines running the trojanized version of the software.
Hackers inserted malicious code into an updated version of the software, called Orion. Approximately 18,000 SolarWinds customers installed tainted updates, between March and June 2020, onto their systems. The malware was inserted in these Orion app versions:
- Orion Platform 2019.4 HF5, version 2019.4.5200.9083
- Orion Platform 2020.2 RC1, version 2020.2.100.12219
- Orion Platform 2020.2 RC2, version 2020.2.5200.12394
- Orion Platform 2020.2, 2020.2 HF1, version 2020.2.5300.12432
This disclosure was followed by a coordinated report issued by Microsoft, FireEye, SolarWinds, and the U.S. government. The report concluded that SolarWinds had been targeted by threat actors who aimed to gather undisclosed information from major customers of theirs, including FireEye.
Compromise: What is Known so Far
A key indicator of the attack was the conceived backdoor that was able to gain access to and breach the SolarWinds Orion build system. This backdoor was attached to the said system by rescripting the legitimate SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll DLL file. This file was then distributed to SolarWinds’ clients in a supply chain attack. This was achieved due to an automatic update platform used to dispense new software updates; clients were unaware of this taking place.
According to reports, the threat actors may have performed trial runs of the distribution method as early as October 2019. Researchers believe that the attackers had already compromised networks previously; it is suggested that they had harvested information or performed other malicious activities silently for months. Due to this, FireEye eventually detected that they were hacked after the threat actors registered a device to the company’s multi-factor authentication (MFA) system using stolen credentials. The alert from the system, regarding an unknown device, was able to notify FireEye of the compromise.
Recommendations
Urgently update any exploited SolarWinds Orion software to Orion Platform version 2020.2.1 HF 2 and Orion Platform 2019.4 HF 6
Third party vendors who may be susceptible to exposure of this compromise should report as part of responsible disclosure and urgently remediate.
In case of possible exposure devise an incident response plan.
Prioritize the TTPs leveraged by the threat actor mapped to mitre att&ck. This is available in Adversary Intelligence within CTM360’s CyberBlindspot.